MCDM'05 - paper no. 14


 

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Impossibility of strategy-proofness with coalition formation under transferable utility

Jaideep Roy, Honorata Sosnowska

Abstract:

Social choice problems may be interpreted as multi-criterial decision making where individual preferences are the criteria and the social planner is the decision maker. A notion of coalitional strategy-proofness for transferable utility scenarios is introduced in such problems. In the paper Impossibility of Strategy-Proofness with Coalition Formation under Transferable Utility (J. Roy, H. Sosnowska) deterministic and probabilistic cardinal social schemes are studies. It is shown that there is no society which is coalitionally strategy-proof.

Reference index:

Jaideep Roy, Honorata Sosnowska, (2006), Impossibility of strategy-proofness with coalition formation under transferable utility, Multiple Criteria Decision Making (1), pp. 225-232

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